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Abstract 
This paper describes an interdisciplinary research project carried out on behalf of the Federal
Ministry of Consumer Protection, Food and Agriculture. The project combines the knowledge
of food experts with decision-orientated approaches from microeconomics and the social sci-
ences. It examines what it is that makes food business operators (from the feed industry to the
retail trade) break (or not break) rules. Through the analysis of both economic incentives and
social context factors, the project aims at contributing to an adequate design of prevention
measures. Four offence-prone regulations identified in the course of the ongoing project are
exemplarily examined with regard to the present incentive situation. 
Keywords: asymmetric information, moral hazard, opportunistic malpractice, poultry
1 Introduction
The probability that food quality and health problems or other undesired outcomes of food pro-
duction (here jointly referred to as “food risks”) are caused by malpractice increases with the
profits that can be earned through opportunistic behaviour (moral hazard). While the probabil-
ity of malpractice on the part of food business operators (behavioural risk) can be conceptual-
ized as varying with its expected economic benefits, there are different reactions to identical
economic temptations because of different levels of “protective factors” in social contexts -
such as values, emotional bonds, peer groups, scenes etc. - that shield actors from deviant
behaviour.
Despite a growing societal awareness regarding behavioural food risks, little empirical
research has been done on the conditions of compliance with the food law and, even more
important, on human malpractice (Hennessy et al., 2003). Consequently, substantial knowl-
edge gaps persist concerning suitable methods for the early identification of food risks that
might (re-) emerge due to malpractice as well as concerning an adequate design of proactive
measures (prevention). The trust that can be reasonably put in food producers despite informa-
tion asymmetries depends on the effectiveness of two types of trust factors: (i) those reducing
the economic payoffs that can be reaped through the behavioural strategy “non-compliance
with rules”, and (ii) those enhancing utility-relevant social context factors that make food pro-
ducers comply despite contrary monetary incentives (Hirschauer and Scheerer, 2004). 498  Reduction of Behavioural Food Risks: An Analysis of Economic Incentives and Social Context Factor... 
From a contract design perspective, incentive-compatible contracts are desirable which “get
the incentives right” (cf. e.g. Akerlof, 1970; Stiglitz, 1987). Economic incentives depend on
parameters such as action-outcome linkages, compliance costs, the probability of being caught,
reputation and the risk of future market losses, sanctions etc. Available contracts are often nei-
ther enforceable nor incentive-compatible. That is, misdirected economic incentives may per-
sist because they cannot (at least not with reasonable costs) be reduced to zero. In this context,
it will be important to consider how incomplete inspection and incomplete tracing influence
the incentives in force. The capability of tracing is relevant in situations where the qualities of
food products purchased from multiple suppliers are only checked at downstream control
points. A systematic generation of trust and the prevention of opportunistic behaviour require
systems analysis approaches, implying that the pay-off relevant economic factors as well as the
non-economic factors that motivate human behaviour are analysed (cf. Ostrom, 2005). In brief,
attacking the problem requires answering the following questions:
• Where are food business operators and their employees exposed to economic temptati-
ons for breaking the rules, i.e., are there misdirected incentives in the present decision
environments?
• What is the actual behaviour of different actors in the light of misdirected economic
incentives? Are there protective factors in the actors’ social contexts such as bonds to
norms and the like which shield actors from yielding to economic temptations?
• What are the adequate prevention measures for interested parties who have less informa-
tion, e.g. downstream buyers in the chain who are faced with credence qualities, and
finally consumers and food safety and environmental protection authorities?
2 The Scientific Approach of the German Poultry Project 
The project analyses behavioural risks in the poultry chain by using an interdisciplinary
approach which combines the knowledge of food technologists with the analytical powers of
microeconomics (game theory, moral hazard analysis) and criminology (control theories, pro-
tective factor analysis). The conception of human decision-making shared by the participating
economists and criminologists is that purposive action, in conjunction with the individual’s
social context factors are responsible for his or her behaviour. Despite this shared conceptual
framework, economists and criminologists focus on different aspects of the actors’ attributes
and decision frameworks due to their respective disciplinary background. That is why we com-
bine the microeconomic and the criminological analysts’ perspectives, capacities and tool-
boxes. Synthesising the disciplinary findings is to facilitate the reconstruction of the behaviour
of food business operators along the poultry chain. A comprehensive understanding of how
various actors assess their decision environment facilitates, in turn, the identification of critical
(offence-prone) activities according to the rationale that offences are most imminent if their
technological viability coincides both with a high level of economic temptations and with
missing protective factors. In economic terms, protective factors (or bonds to norms) can be
seen as restrictions that limit the freedom of “homo oeconomicus” to violate rules, regulations
and contracts whenever it fits his subjective expected utility (Tittle, 2000).
The project is carried out on behalf of the German Federal Ministry of Consumer Protection,
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(BLE) and implemented in co-operation with the Department of Social Sciences (University
Hamburg). Within its course (04/05 - 01/2006) three major working steps are carried out: 
Step A comprises a positive analysis of the economic and social determinants of human
behaviour in conventional and ecological poultry chains. We identify practical and relevant
opportunities for disregarding existing regulations or contract agreements by collecting and
systematising partial data stocks available at scattered places and by gathering knowledge from
various food experts who are familiar with production processes. Following this exploratory
investigation, we collect data for the actors’ decision parameters such as prices, sanctions,
expected controls and tracing probabilities etc. through questionnaires. We then analyse the
economic incentive situations on different chain levels and for various activities by inserting
the collected data into a formal moral hazard model. This facilitates the identification of prob-
lem spots where profit-maximising food business operators are most tempted to break the
rules. Additionally, the social settings and value systems of food business operators and their
effects on compliance with rules in the light of contrary economic temptations are investigated.
This includes situations of high and low norm internalisation. Examples of the latter may be a
low acceptance of rules being perceived to be “bureaucratic rubbish”, or the existence of
“clubs” whose members commonly reject the legitimacy of public authorities.
Step B involves a normative analysis from a “societal” point of view. That is, we investigate
preventive measures which reduce or eliminate moral hazard in the poultry industries. On the
one hand, this refers to measures that change the economic environment in that they reduce
economic temptations for malpractice by changing the underlying determinants such as inten-
sities of control, control points, traceability, sanctions etc. Restrictions such as upper admissi-
ble sanction levels, the costs of different control technologies, and the current food legislation
(including EU regulations operative from 2006) are accounted for. On the other hand, this
relates to measures that change the social environment in that they enhance protective factors
by trying to influence the value system, norm acceptance and self-assessment of different
(groups of) actors. When making recommendations, we consider economic and social findings
simultaneously in order to derive a consistent set of complementary measures. Search for con-
sistency implies the attempt to avoid that progress in one field (e.g. reduction of misdirected
economic incentives through increased controls) is thwarted by drawbacks in others (e.g. dys-
functional effects of controls caused by a decrease in the social acceptance of rules). 
Step C focuses on the methodical conclusions that can be drawn with regard to future fact-
finding activities in other chains. While there is clearly no general methodical approach valid
for all circumstances, structural regularities of decision environments can be systematically
assessed and broken down into categories. This facilitates a classification into problem types
featuring common characteristics. Thus, prudent methodical generalisations may be made, lay-
ing the groundwork for a manual which gives step-by-step guidance of how to gather eco-
nomic-criminological intelligence in different contexts of the food sector in general.500  Reduction of Behavioural Food Risks: An Analysis of Economic Incentives and Social Context Factor... 
3 Preliminary Findings with regard to Offence-prone Regulations 
Carrying out empirical moral hazard analyses, one will soon realise that, due to lacking hard
data and evidence, expert opinion and knowledge is an indispensable source of information to
understand the decision environment as well as the decision-makers’ calculi. In the early
stages of the project we tentatively assessed offence-prone activities through exploratory inter-
views with more than 40 poultry experts from different domains. These include the control
field and law enforcement agencies (e.g. public veterinaries, public food surveillance, public
prosecution, customs), agricultural administration and extension services, consumer and envi-
ronmental protection agencies, poultry businesses on various chain levels (from the feed indus-
try to the retail trade), lobbying groups (e.g. Zentralverband der deutschen Geflügelwirtschaft),
food scientists, consultant veterinaries, quality assurance systems and corresponding organisa-
tions (e.g. QS-Fleisch, ökologische Anbauverbände) etc. 
In this paper we use the available evidence from these exploratory interviews and exemplarily
subject selected activities to a formal moral hazard analysis. It is to be noted that using limited
data sets such as those derived from exploratory expert interviews provides only preliminary
hints regarding the regularities of the decision environment and of decision-making. It should
also be noted that, in this paper, we do not present the results of the criminological analysis
regarding protective factors. Thus, even if we reveal economic temptations to break the rules,
the actual behaviour of food business operators in the light of such temptations is not known.
For demonstration purposes we examine hereafter the incentive situation in four exemplary sit-
uations which reflect different structural characteristics in that they are related to different
types of regulations and relevant outcomes as well as in that the economic decision parameters
include different components and exhibit widely different levels. 
1. Illegal manure disposal: A permission to operate a poultry production unit is only granted
if legal manure disposal is assured. All big producers are specialised firms without signifi-
cant acreage of own farm land. Hence, they regularly contract farmers to take their manure.
The contracts, confirming that farmers will dispose of the manure according to the rules,
suffice to get the permission to operate. The problem is that the environmental authority
does not re-check the contracts once a permission to operate has been granted. Thus, in the
course of time, producers may be tempted to reduce costly disposal contracts. 
2. Non-compliance with waiting periods after application of drugs: Affected poultry are
treated with drugs containing various active agents such as antibiotics, antiparasitics, antic-
occidials etc. After medication periods of up to five days, a waiting period ranging from 2
to 18 days is prescribed before animals may be slaughtered and sold for human consump-
tion. Not meeting the regular delivery date results in increased production costs (extra
feeding costs, extra capacity use) and sales losses for overweight animals. Hence, produc-
ers may be tempted to infringe upon the costly waiting periods. 
3. Non-compliance with cooling temperatures: Specialised transport enterprises deliver
fresh meat to processors. Due to negligence and/or an insufficient state of cooling equip-
ments, the load may be transported at excessive temperatures. Even in case of negligence
on the part of the employee (truck driver), the problem can be seen as a moral hazard prob-
lem on the firm level: it would cause some costs (of compliance) to instruct and motivateStefan Zwoll and Norbert Hirschauer   501
the truck driver sufficiently to prevent negligent malpractice. If there are virtually no con-
sequences to be expected, however, the transport enterprise may be well tempted not to
spend these compliance costs. 
4. Putting spoilt produce on the market: Wholesalers storing frozen meat with expired
best-before use dates may be tempted to sell this meat to processors who are ready to take
it at reduced prices even if it is clearly objectionable. From a wholesaler’s point of view,
temptations result from the chance to obtain some sales revenues and from the chances to
save disposal costs.
4 A Tentative Investigation into the Profitability of (Non-) Compliance
4.1    The Calculus of Decision-makers in Competitive Markets
Understanding which incentives decision-makers face in competitive markets requires that we
reproduce their calculi. We need to examine whether it is more profitable to comply or not to
comply in various circumstances and according to the decision-makers’ perception. From a
principal-agent perspective, this can be seen as a check of the incentive-compatibility cons-
traint. The context is that of a less informed principal (the buyer of a product with credence
qualities, or a public authority responsible for food safety or environmental issues) and a better
informed agent (supplier, food producer). While the principal and the agent have conflicting
interests and maximize their respective objective function, the principal aims at designing an
incentive-compatible contract that takes account of the agent’s expected actions.
In order to do examine the incentives in force, we hereafter adopt a binary perspective in that
we assume that the food producer has two available actions (compliance, non-compliance).
Compliance causes compliance costs K which usually comprise different components, rang-
ing from a direct cost increase of various inputs to opportunity costs caused by a reduction of
sales. There are two expected outcomes (desired, undesired). Modelling a stochastic environ-
ment, we use q (r) to represent the probability of the desired (undesired) outcome condi-
tional on compliance (non-compliance). Stochastic action-outcome linkages (equivalent to
values q < 100 % and r < 100%) arise if a physical (biochemical, hygienic etc.) product quality
is regarded as the relevant outcome. Whenever the very way of behaviour is seen as the rele-
vant outcome (e.g. production with ecologically or socially desirable standards) the linkage is
deterministic and q and r can be equated to unity. Corresponding to outcome, there are two
payoffs. The payoff P for the desired outcome may result from market sales as well as from
subsidy payments. The payoff P-L for the undesired outcome may result from losses in
sales, damage compensation, fines, long-term market losses due to a deterioration of reputation
etc. We furthermore consider that an outcome irregularity is only found with a detection prob-
ability s 100 %. Sometimes, this probability solely reflects the inspection intensity (cf. e.g.
Starbird, 2005). In pooling situations, however, where products are commingled before being
inspected, it reflects the joint effect of dilution and incomplete inspection. Finally, a tracing
coefficient z 100 % is considered. This is important if physical product qualities are checked
at downstream control points and if there are multiple suppliers. In this case, there will be reg-
ularly only a certain probability z < 100 % that the responsible supplier is traced as the origina-
tor of a product irregularity. Incomplete tracing may be due to an insufficient performance of
documentation and traceability systems. It may also be caused by high costs of tracing activi-502  Reduction of Behavioural Food Risks: An Analysis of Economic Incentives and Social Context Factor... 
ties which prevent buyers from actual tracing even if a complete traceability (ability to trace)
is assured through the system in place. In contrast, whenever the observed signal is directly
attached to the agent, the coefficient z can be equated with unity.
Using the above-mentioned symbols and abstracting first from the effects of incomplete
inspection and incomplete tracing, we can reproduce the decision-maker’s calculus as follows: 
expected payoff for compliance  –  expected payoff for non-compliance  =  incentives to comply
After some simple mathematical manipulations we get:
                                          (1)
Eq.(1) demonstrates that we do not need to know the payout level P for the desired outcome,
but only the balance L of both payout levels. A negative result of Eq.(1) implies that the
“incentives are not right”. A positive result, in contrast, means that it is more profitable to com-
ply than not to comply. Eq.(1) shows that, with complete inspection and tracing (i.e. if the out-
come is fully observed and if it is unambiguously attached to the agent), the outcome
probabilities conditional on non-compliance and for compliance coincide with the payoff prob-
abilities. In contrast to that, including a control intensity s < 100 % as well as a tracing coeffi-
cient  z < 100 % in the model changes the expected payoff for non-compliance and for
compliance. This reflects the fact that, independent of the (unknown) outcome, the payoff P is
to be paid whenever the outcome is not ascertained through an inspection. But even if an irreg-
ular (undesired) outcome is found through random controls, offenders face only a probability
z < 100 % of being traced. Considering these effects leads us finally to the following incentive
formulation:
                                (2)
4.2    Parameter Values according to Expert Opinion
The economic determinants represented in Eq. (2) by single parameters may comprise widely
differing components in different contexts. In empirical research, the researcher’s main task is
to identify these components and realistically estimate their values or, at least, magnitudes.
Table 1 indicates the parameter values for the selected activities according to gathered expert
opinion. For the sake of easy understanding, we will briefly comment on these parameters. 
() comply to incentives P r L P r K L P q qP = − + − − − − − + ) 1 ( ) ( ) )( 1 (
comply to incentives K L r q = − − + ) 1 (
1 0 , ) 1 ( ≤ < = − − + ⋅ sz with comply to incentives K L r q szStefan Zwoll and Norbert Hirschauer   503
Table 1. Economic decision parameters* 
* All values are related to the offences as specified below.
1. Illegal manure disposal: Besides food safety legislation, poultry producers face environ-
mental legislation which regulates the maximum amount of manure to be spread on farm land.
Having provided enough manure disposal contracts when setting up business, an interviewed
producer could, according to his own as well as to other expert opinion, reduce the amount of
contracted acreage in subsequent years. Obviously, he would then end up over-fertilising his
own limited farm land. Considering legal disposal itself as the relevant outcome (alternatively,
one could look at physical outcomes such as nitrogen soil levels or nitrogen drains that depend
also on stochastic effects from the environment), action-outcome linkages amount to
q = r = 100 %. The producer expects that the buyer of the poultry is not interested in any infor-
mation about compliance with environmental rules because it does not affect the product qual-
ity. He therefore thinks that the detection probability solely reflects the probability that the
competent environmental authority controls contracted acreage in the years after the permis-
sion to operate has been granted. The perception of an extremely low detection probability
s = 0.1 % is partly due to the producer’s experience of not having been subjected to any
manure controls since setting up production in 1998. Public veterinaries (responsible for ani-
mal health issues) only checked conditions in and next to stables, but did not cross-check with
the conditions imposed by the environmental authority. Furthermore, the producer has heard
no stories of any such controls being made at all. Assuming that, with a capacity of 30 000 tur-
keys, a realistic offence might be to provide no legal disposal for 300 tons of manure, cost sav-
ings of K = 3 300 € per year would arise. In case of detection, no losses of sales are expected.
However, he expects EU-subsidies to be cut by 15 % due to cross-compliance regulations. In
his case, this would result in an effective loss of L = 1 500 € . Finally, the detection of an


































































action-outcome linkages q and r
probability of desired outcome in case of compliance (q) 100% 100% 100% 100%
probability of undesired outcome in case of non-compliance (r) 100% 50% 100% 100%
detection probability s
probability that an undesired outcome is detected 0.1% 0.01% 0.1% 0.5%
compliance costs K (€)
costs arising from compliance with the rules 3300 756 5 6 500
losses L (€)
inflicted losses if non-compliance is proven  1500 25190 35 58 000
thereof: - sales losses














- capitalized long-term market losses 000 5 0 0 0 0
tracing coefficient z
the responsible actor’s probability of being traced 100% 100% 100% 100%504  Reduction of Behavioural Food Risks: An Analysis of Economic Incentives and Social Context Factor... 
2. Non-compliance with waiting periods after application of drugs: The conventional pro-
duction period for light-weight chicken (1.5 kg) is 32 days. Chickens affected by parasites are
regularly treated with the agent “Levamisol” which requires a waiting period of 14 days to pre-
vent residual drug metabolites from persisting in poultry meat (q = 100 %). If the five-day
treatment encompasses, e.g., day 15 to 20 of the production cycle, the producer cannot legally
meet the regular delivery date. If a producer infringes upon the waiting period by two days,
poultry meat is expected to contain residual metabolites with a probability r = 50 % due to sto-
chastic influences. Given the fact that, according to the national food monitoring report, only
10 tests have been made for Levamisol in one year, the probability that an existing irregularity
is detected is estimated to amount approximately to s = 0.01 %. While facing additional costs,
producers have the opportunity to extend the production period to 37 days and deliver heavy-
weight chicken (1.9 kg). However, the additional variable costs (mainly for feeding) and the
opportunity costs of capacity use are not fully compensated by increased sales since prices are
down by 0.1 €/kg due to the change of product category as well as due to the producer’s not
meeting the regular delivery date. The resulting costs of compliance amount to K = 756 € per
production lot of 18 000 chicken. In a rare case of detection, all sales would be lost and dis-
posal costs would amount to 3 900 €. While having heard no stories of producers being fined
for not complying with the waiting period, the interviewees expect the fine to amount to 500 €.
The probability of being traced if residual metabolites are detected amounts to z = 100 %
because different lots are clearly attributed to individual producer through accompanying doc-
uments. 
3. Non-compliance with cooling temperatures: We consider the case of a food transport firm
which delivers truck loads of 20 tons of poultry meat to processors. During transport, the load
must be constantly kept at 4°C (core poultry temperature). Negligence and/or an insufficient
state of cooling equipments may cause the load to be transported and delivered at 5°C or more.
In some cases, enterprises may even increase the probability of negligent malpractice by
replacing experienced personnel by low-cost and ill-trained temporary staff. Abstracting from
(the monitoring of) quality consequences and considering the very way of transport as the rele-
vant outcome, we can equate the action-outcome linking probabilities q and r with unity.
According to expert opinion, in most cases no controls of transport temperature are made by
the processor due to the attitude of those in charge that “The hygienic quality of goods is not
really affected by slightly exceeding transport temperatures for a short while”. If so, the detec-
tion of negligence will only occur if the public food surveillance authority carries out one of its
very rare random on-site controls. The detection probability s = 0.1 % simply reflects this
minor control intensity. Compliance on the part of the transport enterprise implies spending
money (compliance costs) on improving the maintenance of cooling equipments as well as on
human resource management in that the firm’s truck drivers are regularly instructed and moti-
vated to prevent negligence. The proportional compliance costs per load are estimated to
amount to K = 5 €. The caution issued for such minor offences amounts to L = 35 €. Again, the
observed activity is directly attached to the offender and z = 100 %.Stefan Zwoll and Norbert Hirschauer   505
4. Putting spoilt produce on the market: Food business operators, e.g. wholesalers, may
legally sell food products even after the best-before use date if they ascertain - through appro-
priate controls - that they are still fit for consumption. However, a wholesaler commits an
offence if, neglecting evidence, he sells products that are clearly not fit for human consump-
tion. Assuming such a deterministic context, we can equate q and r with unity. According to
expert opinion, there is only a minor detection probability s = 0.5 % (or less) since wholesalers
can choose a time of delivery outside the public veterinary’s regular inspection times. Refer-
ring to a situation where a processor would be willing to take 5 tons of spoilt frozen processing
meat at a price of 1 €/kg, the wholesaler’s compliance costs K comprise opportunity costs, i.e.
loss of sales (5 000 €), and disposal costs (1 500 €). Inflicted losses in case of detection com-
prise sales losses (5 000 €), a fine (1 500 €), disposal costs (1 500 €), and future market losses
(50 000 €). The observed activity is directly attached to the offender (z = 100 %).
4.3    Incentives
Part A of table 2 indicates the incentive situation resulting from the parameter values indicated
in table 1. It is interesting to note that there is a very high temptation to break the rules in all
situations according to the experts’ perception of parameters. 
Table 2. The incentive situation*
* All values are related to the offences as specified above.
Comparing the presently effective parameter values from table 1 with the critical values given
in part B of table 2 reveals which change of losses L (inflicted in case of detection) and which
change of detection probability s would ensure incentive-compatible contracts. Ceteris paribus,
the inflicted losses would need to be increased to very high levels in order to get the incentives
right. This is mainly due to the minor detection probabilities in force. Increasing the detection
probability to indicated levels would be an alternative to guarantee the incentive-compatibility
of the system. In situation 1, however, even a detection probability of 100% would leave the
producer with a 1 800 € temptation to break the rule. This is due to the low level of inflicted
losses in case of detection relative to compliance costs.
5 Conclusions
This article describes and applies a practical tool which can be used as a basis for systematic
analyses of moral hazard in various food production contexts. Its overall perspective is that one
needs to identify those critical activities which exhibit the highest economic temptations for
rule-breaking. Its binary moral hazard approach, while being simple enough to account for the
limited availability of data, accommodates the crucial elements of many food risk problems in












A: economic inferiority (-) of compliance (€) -3299 -755 -5 -6210
B: ceteris paribus critical level of L (€) 3300000 15120000 5000 1300000
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It also accounts for the effects of reputation by incorporating long-term market losses into the
inflicted losses that need to be considered in the case of detection (cf. e.g. Tirole, 1996, for
more details on the effects of reputation). Going beyond this paper’s positive analyses and try-
ing to identify optimal contract and control systems in a normative analysis would require that
the costs of different control and sanction regimes are considered. Furthermore, more reliable
conclusions require that an enlarged data base is analysed which can be statistically evaluated
and which provides significant information regarding the mean and the range of parameter val-
ues. In the course of the above-described project we will proceed from exploring expert opin-
ion to addressing a larger number of experts through questionnaires. 
While it is well known that the identification of critical points is a prerequisite to guide measures
carried out, e.g., by public authorities in complex environments such as food production con-
texts, public surveillance is faced with two major shortcomings: first, the data as well as the
expert knowledge that is already existent in various public agencies is by no means systemati-
cally collected and evaluated. Regularly, different authorities do neither compare nor make joint
use of the data sets the dispose of. This is partly a problem of the distribution of competencies
within a federal constitution. It is partly, however, also due to a remediable lack of cooperation
between agencies which are simply responsible for different aspects (such as environmental
issues or food safety issues). Often, the information flow is even disrupted between different
stages of a process, and situations occur where the results of investigations are not even fed back
to the control personnel who have initially reported an offence. Second, and equally disadvanta-
geous, neither control intensities nor the definition of control points nor the sanctioning behav-
iour is based on a risk-based classification of firms and a sensible rationale which at least “tries
to influence the incentives in the right direction”. Instead, they are often purely incidental and a
reflection of budgetary constraints, causing widely differing incentive situations depending on
local coincidences. This is quite the opposite of what is necessary to prevent malpractice, namely
to use available budgets for those measures which are most effective in that they are apt to
reduce harmful and self-interested behaviour. Besides systematically trying to reduce misdi-
rected incentives, prevention also requires that one looks at smart controls (Braithwaite, 2003)
that consider trust factors rooted in the social context and social-psychological findings. 
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